

The Important Details Of Windows Authentication

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
2017-05-04

<https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2017/SambaXP/>


Topics

- ▶ Windows Domains, Forests and Trusts
- ▶ Netlogon Secure Channel
- ▶ Authentication Protocols
- ▶ Authorization Token
- ▶ Trust Routing Table
- ▶ New Kerberos Features
- ▶ Thanks!
- ▶ Questions?

Layout of a single Windows Domain




Layout of an Active Directory Forest (with one Tree)



Forest Information (with one Tree)

- ▶ TOP_LEVEL_NAME: example.com
- ▶ TOP_LEVEL_NAME: example.private
- ▶ DOMAIN_INFO: EXAMPLE; example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-11
- ▶ DOMAIN_INFO: ASIA; asia.example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-22
- ▶ DOMAIN_INFO: DEVEL; devel.asia.example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-33
- ▶ DOMAIN_INFO: PRODUCT; product.asia.example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-44
- ▶ DOMAIN_INFO: EUROPE; europe.example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-44

Layout of an Active Directory Forest (with multiple Trees)



- ▶ TOP_LEVEL_NAME: corp1.private
- ▶ TOP_LEVEL_NAME: corp2.private
- ▶ DOMAIN_INFO: CORP1; corp1.private; S-1-5-21-77-88-11
- ▶ DOMAIN_INFO: DEVEL; devel.corp1.private; S-1-5-21-77-88-22
- ▶ DOMAIN_INFO: PRODUCT; product.corp1.private; S-1-5-21-99-88-33
- ▶ DOMAIN_INFO: CORP2; corp2.private; S-1-5-21-99-88-44
- ▶ DOMAIN_INFO: SUPPORT; support.corp2.private; S-1-5-21-99-88-55

Trust Types (low level)

- ▶ LSA_TRUST_TYPE_DOWNLEVEL
 - ▶ This is used for NT4 Domains.
 - ▶ It can only handle NTLMSSP.
- ▶ LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL
 - ▶ This is used for AD Domains.
 - ▶ It supports NTLMSSP by default.
 - ▶ It supports Kerberos, the Realm is the Dns-Domain-Name.
- ▶ LSA_TRUST_TYPE_MIT
 - ▶ This is used for trusts to RFC4120-compliant Kerberos.
 - ▶ Unlikely to be implemented in Samba.
- ▶ LSA_TRUST_TYPE_DCE
 - ▶ Not used in Windows.

- ▶ Trusting vs. Trusted Domain
 - ▶ Users of the "trusted" domain can access resources of the "trusting" domain.
- ▶ LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND
 - ▶ The local domain is the "trusted" domain.
 - ▶ The specified/remote domain is the "trusting" domain.
 - ▶ Also known as INCOMING.
- ▶ LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
 - ▶ The local domain is the "trusting" domain.
 - ▶ The specified/remote domain is the "trusted" domain.
 - ▶ Also known as OUTGOING.

Transitive vs. Non-Transitive Trusts

- ▶ Non-Transitive Trust
 - ▶ This is just a trust between two single domains.
- ▶ Transitive Trust
 - ▶ The trust between two single domains is expanded to indirect trusts.
 - ▶ DOM1 trusts DOM2, while DOM2 trusts DOM3, so DOM1 implicitly trusts DOM3.
 - ▶ In some situations a transitive trust is some kind of default route.

Trust Types (high level, Part 1)

- ▶ Workstation (Domain Member) Trust
 - ▶ LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND to the primary domain.
 - ▶ LSA_TRUST_TYPE_DOWNLEVEL (NT4) or LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (AD).
 - ▶ Transitive Trust as default route.
 - ▶ computer account can only reliable access its primary domain.
- ▶ External Domain Trust
 - ▶ LSA_TRUST_TYPE_DOWNLEVEL (NT4) or LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (AD).
 - ▶ Non-Transitive
- ▶ Forest Trust
 - ▶ LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (AD) between two forest root domains.
 - ▶ Transitive Trust (by default) between the two forests only.

Trust Types (high level, Part 2 within Forests)

- ▶ Parent Child Trusts
 - ▶ LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND and LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
 - ▶ LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (AD).
 - ▶ LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST.
 - ▶ The child is a DNS-subdomain of the parent
 - ▶ Transitive Trust, on the parent with a route to the child and the related grandchildren.
 - ▶ Transitive Trust, on the child as default route.
 - ▶ Automatically created together with the child domain.
- ▶ Tree Root Trusts
 - ▶ Similar to Parent Child Trust.
 - ▶ The new tree root is not DNS-domain below the forest root.
 - ▶ Transitive Trust, on the forest root with a route to the new tree root and the related grandchildren.
 - ▶ Transitive Trust, on the child as default route.
 - ▶ Automatically created together with the new tree root domain.

- ▶ Shortcut Trust
 - ▶ LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND and/or LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
 - ▶ LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (AD).
 - ▶ LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST.
 - ▶ Non-Transitive, acts as direct route to the specified domain.
 - ▶ Created by an administrator for performance reasons.

Trust Attributes (low level)

The content of the trustAttributes attribute in Samba:

```
typedef [public, bitmap32bit] bitmap {
    LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE           = 0x00000001,
    LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_UPLEVEL_ONLY            = 0x00000002,
    LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN      = 0x00000004,
    LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE       = 0x00000008,
    LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION      = 0x00000010,
    LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST          = 0x00000020,
    LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL       = 0x00000040,
    LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_USES_RC4_ENCRYPTION     = 0x00000080
    // TODO LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION_NO_TGT_DELEGATION = 0x00000200
    // TODO LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_PIM_TRUST        = 0x00000400
} lsa_TrustAttributes;
```

Forest (routing) Information

- ▶ The information about a forest:
 - ▶ can be queried from the forest root of the "trusted" forest by `netr_GetForestTrustInformation()` constructed by the information under `CN=Partitions,CN=Configuration,...`
 - ▶ is stored in the "msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo" attribute in the root domain of the "trusting" forest.
- ▶ It is an array of records of the following types:
 - ▶ `FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO` includes Netbios-Name, DNS-Name and Domain-Sid.
 - ▶ `FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME` includes a top level DNS-Name that part of the forest (including all DNS-subdomains).
 - ▶ `FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME_EX` includes a top level DNS-Name that is explicitly excluded from the forest (including all DNS-subdomains).
 - ▶ Individual records will be disabled if conflicts with other trusts are detected.
 - ▶ Individual records can also be disabled by the admin.

Netlogon Secure Schannel (Part1)

- ▶ Having an `LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND` Trust:
 - ▶ Means the "trusting" workstation/domain can establish a Netlogon Secure Channel to DCs of the "trusted" domain using the computer/trust account.
 - ▶ The NETLOGON protocol is based on DCERPC, see [MS-NRPC].
- ▶ Establishing a global session state with a "trusted" DC:
 - ▶ `netr_ServerReqChallenge()` and `netr_ServerAuthenticate[2,3]()` are used to do a challenge/response authentication
 - ▶ The global session state is indexed by the computer name of the "client".
 - ▶ The global session state contains the initial session key, a sequence number.
 - ▶ Samba uses 'struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState' for this state.
 - ▶ This state is stored in `netlogon_creds_cli.tdb` (on the client) and `schannel.store.tdb` (on the server).

- ▶ A lot of functions operate on the global session state:
 - ▶ netr_LogonSamLogon[WithFlags](), netr_ServerPasswordSet[2](), netr_LogonGetDomainInfo(), netr_GetForestTrustInformation() and others.
 - ▶ All functions using 'netr_Authenticator' arguments.
 - ▶ These functions do some rolling crypto on the global session state.
 - ▶ These functions need to be strictly ordered (globally!)
 - ▶ Some of them also encrypt some application level fields with the current global session key.

- ▶ The NETLOGON protocol implements a custom DCERPC authentication type (auth_type=68):
 - ▶ The DCERPC Bind/AlterContext just passes the domain and computer names to the server.
 - ▶ The server takes a copy of the current global session based on the provided computer name.
 - ▶ This copy will be the session key for the lifetime of the DCERPC auth context.
 - ▶ Client and server provide DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY or DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY protection for the auth context.
 - ▶ The connection doesn't support concurrent multiplexing and only one request at a time.

- ▶ Usage of DCERPC authentication type (auth_type=68)
 - ▶ It is typically used for a protected NETLOGON connection.
 - ▶ It is also used for LSA connections and the `lsa_LookupNames4()` and `lsa_LookupSids3()` calls.
 - ▶ Typically the "trusting" side of the trust should only use these NETLOGON and LSA connections to communicate with the "trusted" domain.

- ▶ Authentication verification uses NETLOGON:
 - ▶ `netr_LogonSamLogon[WithFlags,Ex]()` is typically used to verify NTLMSSP authentication.
 - ▶ But it's not limited to NTLMSSP, e.g. Kerberos PAC-Validation.
- ▶ Authentication should scale:
 - ▶ `netr_LogonSamLogonEx()` is an optimization of `netr_LogonSamLogon[WithFlags]()`.
 - ▶ It isn't bound to the `netr_Authenticator` global ordering.
 - ▶ It avoids application level encryption with the current global session key in most cases if `DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY` is in use.
 - ▶ It can use multiple DCERPC connections to scale.

SPNEGO Authentication example

- ▶ All application protocols used in active directory domains use SPNEGO (RFC 4178, [MS-SPNG]) in order to negotiate between NTLMSSP ([MS-NLMP]) or Kerberos (RFC 4120, [MS-KILE])

```
▼ SMB2 (Server Message Block Protocol version 2)
  ▶ SMB2 Header
  ▼ Session Setup Request (0x01)
    ▶ StructureSize: 0x0019
    ▶ Flags: 0
    ▶ Security mode: 0x02, Signing required
    ▶ Capabilities: 0x00000001, DFS
      Channel: None (0x00000000)
      Previous Session Id: 0x0000000000000000
    ▼ Security Blob: 60820c9306062b060105052a0820c8730820c83a0243022...
      Offset: 0x00000058
      Length: 3223
    ▼ GSS-API Generic Security Service Application Program Interface
      OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.2 (SPNEGO - Simple Protected Negotiation)
    ▼ Simple Protected Negotiation
      ▼ negTokenInit
        ▼ mechTypes: 3 items
          MechType: 1.2.840.48018.1.2.2 (MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5)
          MechType: 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 (KRB5 - Kerberos 5)
          MechType: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.2.10 (NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider)
        mechToken: 60820c5106092a864886f71201020201006e820c4030820c...
        ▶ krb5_blob: 60820c5106092a864886f71201020201006e820c4030820c...
```

Kerberos Network Traffic With Trusts

- ▶ Client (administrator@W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:00:01)
- ▶ DC in Client-Domain (W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:83)
- ▶ Forest-Trust between W2012R2-L4.BASE and W4EDOM-L4.BASE
- ▶ DC in Server-Domain (W4EDOM-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:33)
- ▶ Server (w2008r8-132) in W4EDOM-L4.BASE (HW 00:00:00:09:01:32)
- ▶ Access to \\w2008r2-132.w4edom-l4.base using Kerberos

AS-REQ	administrator@w2012r2-l4.base	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:83
AS-REP	krbtgt/W2012R2-L4.BASE@w2012r2-l4.base	00:00:00:09:01:83	00:00:00:09:00:01
TGS-REQ	cifs/w2008r2-132.w4edom-l4.base@w2012r2-l4.base	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:83
TGS-REP	krbtgt/W4EDOM-L4.BASE@w2012r2-l4.base	00:00:00:09:01:83	00:00:00:09:00:01
TGS-REQ	cifs/w2008r2-132.w4edom-l4.base@w4edom-l4.base	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:33
TGS-REP	cifs/w2008r2-132.w4edom-l4.base@w4edom-l4.base	00:00:00:09:01:33	00:00:00:09:00:01
Session Setup Request		00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:32
Session Setup Response		00:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:00:01

- ▶ The client talks to DCs directly.
- ▶ The server gets the authorization data from the kerberos ticket

NTLMSSP Network Traffic With Trusts

- ▶ Client (administrator@W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:00:01)
- ▶ DC in Client-Domain (W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:83)
- ▶ Forest-Trust between W2012R2-L4.BASE and W4EDOM-L4.BASE
- ▶ DC in Server-Domain (W4EDOM-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:33)
- ▶ Server (w2008r8-132) in W4EDOM-L4.BASE (HW 00:00:00:09:01:32)
- ▶ Access to \\w2008r2-132.w4edom-l4.base using NTLMSSP

Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:32
Session Setup Response, Error: STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED, NTLMSSP_	00:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:00:01
Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: W2012R2-L4.BASE\administrator	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:32
NetrLogonSamLogonEx request	00:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:01:33
NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags request	00:00:00:09:01:33	00:00:00:09:01:83
NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags response	00:00:00:09:01:83	00:00:00:09:01:33
NetrLogonSamLogonEx response	00:00:00:09:01:33	00:00:00:09:01:32
Session Setup Response	00:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:00:01

- ▶ The server talks to the DC in its own domain only.
- ▶ The DC may forward the request to trusted domains.

The result of a successful authentication

- ▶ Inputs to authentication:
 - ▶ The client typically provides a full qualified username together with a password.
 - ▶ Smartcards can also be used to do Kerberos (PKINIT) authentication.
- ▶ Output from authentication:
 - ▶ The target server needs to make sure the client is authenticated.
 - ▶ Typically client and server negotiate a session key.
 - ▶ The target server gets an authorization token for the authenticated user.
 - ▶ The authorization token is contained in the Kerberos service ticket.
 - ▶ netr_LogonSamLogon[WithFlags,Ex]() provides the authorization token for NTLMSSP.

The authorization token

- ▶ Elements in the token:
 - ▶ It contains things like username, fullname, logon_domain, various timestamps.
 - ▶ The most important information is the list of group memberships.
- ▶ The token provided by the "trusted" domain:
 - ▶ Needs to be expanded with local groups on the "trusting" side.
 - ▶ Needs to be do SID-Filtering on "trusting" side to avoid faked group memberships.
 - ▶ The exact SID-Filtering rules depend on the trustAttribute values.
 - ▶ It is important to do the expanding and filtering on all trust boundaries of a transitive chain.
 - ▶ Currently Samba does not do any SID-Filtering at all!
- ▶ In Samba we use 'struct auth_session_info' for the expanded token:
 - ▶ It contains a list of SIDS.
 - ▶ The details of the Windows user.
 - ▶ It contains a uid and a list of gid's.
 - ▶ The unix username.

Authorization Token without Authentication (Part1)

- ▶ There're some situations when a service needs to impersonate a user locally:
 - ▶ This can happen without getting an authentication for that user.
 - ▶ SSH public-key authentication, sudo or nfs3 access are typical usecases.
- ▶ Getting an authorization token without authentication is tricky:
 - ▶ Currently winbindd tries to get the 'tokenGroups' of the user object via LDAP
 - ▶ In situations with trusted domains it means that winbindd will try to connect a DC of the users primary domain without having a direct trust to it.
 - ▶ There're a lot of situations where this doesn't work, e.g. with OUTBOUND only trusts.
 - ▶ It is a very hard task because the expanding and filtering at the trust boundaries of the transitive chain can't be simulated.
 - ▶ So the result is often wrong!

- ▶ The only reliable solution is S4U2Self:
 - ▶ S4U2Self ([MS-SFU]), a Kerberos extension, allows a service to ask a KDC for an service ticket for a given user.
 - ▶ Sadly there're quite some bugs in current versions of MIT Kerberos and Heimdal.
 - ▶ But the bugs can be fixed.

Using a strict trust routing table (Part1)

- ▶ Making efficient and robust usage of trust relationships:
 - ▶ It is required to construct a routing table that knows about routing via transitive trusts.
 - ▶ The table is constructed by the list of direct trusts and their (optionally) related forest information.
 - ▶ The goal is that communication only appears between direct trusts.

Using a strict trust routing table (Part2)

- ▶ Using the routing table for Kerberos:
 - ▶ The routing table is mainly used in the KDC, which means the basics for two-way (INBOUND and OUTBOUD) trusts as an AD DC are already in place.
 - ▶ The client just talk to a KDC in the primary domain and follow referrals, it doesn't really need the routing table.
- ▶ Using the routing table for NTLMSSP:
 - ▶ It also needs to be used the NETLOGON and LSA servers in order to find out if a requests should be routed via winbindd to a trusted domain.
 - ▶ The routing table needs to be used within winbindd.
 - ▶ This will make the code much more robust as a domain member.
 - ▶ And it will also provide the basics for two-way (INBOUND and OUTBOUD) trusts as an AD DC.

New Kerberos Features (Part 1)

- ▶ Samba provided features
 - ▶ We try to emulate the features of the Windows 2008R2 DC functional level
 - ▶ Everything else will need some development effort.
- ▶ Windows 2012 introduced support for Kerberos FAST:
 - ▶ Typically Kerberos authentication requests (AS-Req) use the password of the user to encrypt a timestamp.
 - ▶ This allows attackers to do offline dictionary against the users typically less random password.
 - ▶ Typically the passwords of trust accounts, e.g. computer accounts have trully random passwords.
 - ▶ The solution is to use a ticket created with the computer account to protect the users AS-REQ.

New Kerberos Features (Part 2)

- ▶ Windows 2012 introduced support for Compound Identities:
 - ▶ If the client uses FAST, the KDC is able to know from which device (computer) the user is coming.
 - ▶ This KDC add a new PAC_DEVICE_INFO element to the Kerberos ticket.
 - ▶ As result the authorization token of the user will also have information of the device, which can be used to use more advanced access restrictions.
- ▶ Windows 2012 introduced support for CLAIMS:
 - ▶ An administrator can define and assign "claims".
 - ▶ It allows more flexible access control beside using groups.
 - ▶ The Kerberos ticket will contain PAC_CLIENT_CLAIMS_INFO and PAC_DEVICE_CLAIMS_INFO
 - ▶ More research is required to fully understand how CLAIMS work.

New Kerberos Features (Part 3)

- ▶ Windows 2016 introduced support for Privileged Identity Management (PIM):
 - ▶ This feature will add timed group memberships
 - ▶ E.g. an administrative user will only be a member of the domain admins group for an hour.
 - ▶ The lifetime for Kerberos tickets is very limited compared to the default of 10 hours, with a renew up to a week.
 - ▶ There's also a special forest trust mode for PIM.
 - ▶ More research is required to fully understand how PIM work.

- ▶ TECHNET: "How Domain and Forest Trusts Work"
- ▶ [MS-AUTHSOD]
- ▶ [MS-PAC]
- ▶ [MS-LSAD]
- ▶ [MS-LSAT]
- ▶ [MS-DTYP]

Questions?

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