

SDC STORAGE DEVELOPER CONFERENCE

Windows Authentication With Multiple Domains and Forests

Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Samba Team / SerNet

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Check for updates: https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2017/SDC/

Update from SambaXP 2017



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- This is an update to my talk at SambaXP.
- "The Important Details Of Windows Authentication"

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Please have a look at the slides:

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- https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2017/SambaXP/
- An audio recording is also available here:
- https://sambaxp.org/archive_data/SambaXP2017-AUDIO/Day3/Track2/
- Check for an updated version of this slides here:
- https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2017/SDC/

Windows Trusts (2/34)

Topics



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- Windows Domains, Forests and Trusts
- Netlogon Secure Channel
- Authentication Protocols
- Authorization Token/S4U2Self
- Selective Authentication/Restrict NTLM
- New Kerberos Features
- Trust Routing Table
- Improvements in Samba
- Further Authentication Topics
- Questions?
- Useful links

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Trust Types and Directions (low level)



Trust Types (only relevant ones):

- LSA_TRUST_TYPE_DOWNLEVEL (NT4)
- LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (AD)
- Trust Directions:
 - LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND
 - LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND (like on a domain member)
- ► For further details see my SambaXP talk.



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Trust Attributes (low level)



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The content of the trustAttributes attribute in Samba:

typedef [public,bitmap32bit] bitmap {	
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE	= 0x00000001,
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_UPLEVEL_ONLY	= 0x00000002, /* only kerberos */
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN	= 0x00000004,
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE	= 0x0000008, /* cross forest trust */
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION	= 0x00000010, /* selective auth */
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST	= 0x00000020, /* transitive by default */
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL	= 0x00000040,
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_USES_RC4_ENCRYPTION	= 0x0000080
<pre>// TODO LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANI</pre>	ZATION_NO_TGT_DELEGATION = 0x00000200
<pre>// TODO LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_PIM_TRUST</pre>	$= 0 \times 00000400$
<pre>} lsa_TrustAttributes;</pre>	



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Trust Types (high level, Part 1)



- Workstation (Domain Member) Trust
- External Domain Trust
- Forest Trust

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
- Parent Child Trusts (Within Forest)
- Tree Root Trusts (Within Forest)
- Shortcut Trust (Within Forest)
- ► For further details see my SambaXP talk.

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Layout of an Active Directory Forest (with multiple Trees)





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Forest Information (with multiple Trees)



- TOP_LEVEL_NAME: corp1.private
- TOP_LEVEL_NAME: corp2.private
- DOMAIN_INFO: CORP1; corp1.private; S-1-5-21-77-88-11
- DOMAIN_INFO: DEVEL; devel.corp1.private; S-1-5-21-77-88-22
- DOMAIN_INFO: PRODUCT; product.corp1.private; S-1-5-21-99-88-33
- DOMAIN_INFO: CORP2; corp2.private; S-1-5-21-99-88-44
- ► DOMAIN_INFO: SUPPORT; support.corp2.private; S-1-5-21-99-88-55



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Netlogon Secure Schannel



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- ► Having an LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND Trust:
 - Means the "trusting" workstation/domain can establish a Netlogon Secure Channel to DCs of the "trusted" domain using the computer/trust account.
 - ► The NETLOGON protocol is bases on DCERPC, see [MS-NRPC].
- Authentication verification uses NETLOGON:
 - netr_LogonSamLogon[WithFlags,Ex]() is typically used to verify NTLMSSP authentication.
 - But it's not limited to NTLMSSP, e.g. Kerberos PAC-Validation.
- Forest Trust Information is available via NETLOGON:
 - netr_GetForestTrustInformation() is used to get the details
- ► For further details see my SambaXP talk.

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SPNEGO Authentication example



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 All application protocols used in active directory domains use SPNEGO (RFC 4178, [MS-SPNG]) in order to negotiate between NTLMSSP ([MS-NLMP]) or Kerberos (RFC 4120, [MS-KILE])

```
▼ SMB2 (Server Message Block Protocol version 2)
▶ SMB2 Header
▼ Session Setup Request (0x01)
  ▶ StructureSize: 0x0019
  ▶ Flags: 0
  Security mode: 0x02, Signing required
  ▶ Capabilities: 0x00000001, DFS
    Channel: None (0x00000000)
    Previous Session Id: 0x000000000000000
  ▼ Security Blob: 60820c9306062b0601050502a0820c8730820c83a0243022...
       Offset: 0x00000058
       Length: 3223
     ▼ GSS-API Generic Security Service Application Program Interface
         OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.2 (SPNEGO - Simple Protected Negotiation)
       ▼ Simple Protected Negotiation
          ▼ negTokenInit
             ▼ mechTypes: 3 items
                 MechType: 1.2.840.48018.1.2.2 (MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5)
                 MechType: 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 (KRB5 - Kerberos 5)
                 MechType: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.2.10 (NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider)
              mechToken: 60820c5106092a864886f71201020201006e820c4030820c...
             krb5 blob: 60820c5106092a864886f71201020201006e820c4030820c...
```

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Kerberos Network Traffic With Trusts



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- Client (administrator@W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:00:00:01)
- DC in Client-Domain (W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:83)
- ► Forest-Trust between W2012R2-L4.BASE and W4EDOM-L4.BASE
- DC in Server-Domain (W4EDOM-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:33)
- Server (w2008r8-132) in W4EDOM-L4.BASE (HW 00:00:00:09:01:32)
- Access to \\w2008r2-132.w4edom-l4.base using Kerberos

AS-REQ	administrator@W2012R2-L4.BASE	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:83
AS-REP	krbtgt/W2012R2-L4.BASE@W2012R2-L4.BASE	00:00:00:09:01:83	00:00:00:09:00:01
TGS-REQ	cifs/w2008r2-133.w4edom-l4.base@W2012R2-L4.BASE	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:83
TGS-REP	krbtgt/W4EDOM-L4.BASE@W2012R2-L4.BASE	00:00:00:09:01:83	00:00:00:09:00:01
TGS-REQ	cifs/w2008r2-133.w4edom-l4.base@W4EDOM-L4.BASE	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:33
TGS-REP	cifs/w2008r2-133.w4edom-l4.base@W4EDOM-L4.BASE	00:00:00:09:01:33	00:00:00:09:00:01
Session	Setup Request	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:32
Session	Setup Response	00:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:00:01

The client talks to DCs directly.

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The server gets the authorization data from the kerberos ticket

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NTLMSSP Network Traffic With Trusts



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- Client (administrator@W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:00:00:01)
- DC in Client-Domain (W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:83)
- Forest-Trust between W2012R2-L4.BASE and W4EDOM-L4.BASE
- DC in Server-Domain (W4EDOM-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:33)
- Server (w2008r8-132) in W4EDOM-L4.BASE (HW 00:00:00:09:01:32)
- Access to \\w2008r2-132.w4edom-I4.base using NTLMSSP

Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:32
Session Setup Response, Error: STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED, NTLMSSP	00:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:00:01
Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: W2012R2-L4.BASE\administrator	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:32
NetrLogonSamLogonEx request	00:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:01:33
NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags request	00:00:00:09:01:33	00:00:00:09:01:83
NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags response	00:00:00:09:01:83	00:00:00:09:01:33
NetrLogonSamLogonEx response	00:00:00:09:01:33	00:00:00:09:01:32
Session Setup Response	00:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:00:01

The server talks to the DC in its own domain only.

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• The DC may forward the request to trusted domains.

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The result of a successful authentication



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- Inputs to authentication:
 - The client typically provides a full qualified username together with a password.
 - Smartcards can also be used to do Kerberos (PKINIT) authentication.
- Output from authentication:

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- The target server needs to make sure the client is authenticated.
- Typically client and server negotiate a session key.
- The target server gets an authorization token for the authenticated user.
- The authorization token is contained in the Kerberos service ticket.
- netr_LogonSamLogon[WithFlags,Ex]() provides the authorization token for NTLMSSP.

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The authorization token



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- Elements in the token:
 - It contains things like username, fullname, logon_domain, various timestamps.
 - The most important information is the list of group memberships.
- The token provided by the "trusted" domain:
 - Needs to be expanded with local groups on the "trusting" side.
 - Needs to be do SID-Filtering on "trusting" side to avoid faked group memberships.
 - The exact SID-Filtering rules depend on the trustAttribute values.
 - It is important to do the expanding and filtering on all trust boundaries of a transitive chain.
 - Currently Samba does not do any SID-Filtering at all!
- In Samba we use 'struct auth_session_info' for the expanded token:
 - It contains a list of SIDS.
 - The details of the Windows user.
 - It contains a uid and a list of gid's.
 - The unix username.

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Authorization Token without Authentication (Part1)

- There're some situations when a service needs to impersonate a user locally:
 - This can happen without getting an authentication for that user.
 - SSH public-key authentication, sudo or nfs3 access are tyipical usecases.
- Getting an authorization token without authentication is tricky:
 - Currently winbindd tries to get the 'tokenGroups' of the user object via LDAP
 - In situations with trusted domains it means that winbindd will try to connect a DC of the users primary domain without having a direct trust to it.
 - There're a lot of situations where this doesn't work, e.g. with OUTBOUND only trusts.
 - It is a very hard task because the expanding and filtering at the trust boundaries of the transitive chain can't be simulated.
 - So the result is often wrong!

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Authorization Token without Authentication (Part2)

- ► The only reliable solution is S4U2Self:
 - S4U2Self ([MS-SFU]), a Kerberos extension, allows a service to ask a KDC for an service ticket for a given user.
 - Sadly there're quite some bugs in current versions of MIT Kerberos and Heimdal.
 - But the bugs can be fixed.
- Details of S4U2Self:

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- The service needs a TGT for the user realm first.
- ► Referrals are followed from the service realm to the user realm.
- Then it requests a S4U2Self Ticket specifying the impersonated user principal and the service principal.
- In order to get a usable ticket referrals are followed back to the service realm.
- This requires a two-way trust.

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Forest/Domain-wide Authentication



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► Forest/Domain-wide Authentication (the default) allows:

- Authentication of each principal of the trusted forest/domain
- Authentication to each service in the trusting forest/domain
- Authorization is handled by:
 - Using ACLs on individual resources (objects, files, ...)
 - Access might be granted just by "Authenticated Users" ACEs.
- One-way trusts:
 - Often used to limit the authentication between organizations.
 - Make the use of S4U2Self impossible.



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Selective Authentication (Cross Organization Trusts)

- Trusts can be marked for selective authentication:
 - Using LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION
 - The trusting end adds the OTHER_ORGANIZATION SID (S-1-5-1000) to any token
 - By default authentication of trusted principals to trusting services is rejected with STATUS_AUTHENTICATION_FIREWALL_FAILED.
- Selective authentication checking:
 - Only done if the token contains S-1-5-1000
 - The "AllowedToAuthenticateTo" extended access right is required on the AD object of the service.
- Advantages of selective authentication:
 - It is much more flexible than the all or nothing of one-way trusts.
 - It allows S4U2Self to work.

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- Status of selective authentication within Samba:
 - Not implemented yet, similar to all SID expanding/filtering.

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Restrict NTLM... (Part1)



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- Windows has serveral ways to restrict the use of NTLM based authentication:
- Client:
 - Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers
 - Restrict NTLM: Add remote server exceptions for NTLM authentication
 - NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED is generated if NTLM is not allowed
- Server:

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- Restrict NTLM: Incoming NTLM Traffic
- Restrict NTLM: Audit Incoming NTLM Traffic
- NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED is generated if NTLM is not allowed
- Domain Controller:

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- Restrict NTLM: NTLM authentication in this domain
- Restrict NTLM: Add server exceptions in this domain
- Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain
- NT_STATUS_NTLM_BLOCKED is generated if NTLM is not allowed

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Restrict NTLM... (Part2)



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- With Samba 4.7 we'll have the following options "ntlm auth":
 - "ntlmv1-permitted" (alias "yes") Allow NTLMv1 and above for all clients.
 - "ntlmv2-only" (alias "no") Do not allow NTLMv1 to be used, but permit NTLMv2.
 - "mschapv2-and-ntlmv2-only" Only allow NTLMv1 when the client promises that it is providing MSCHAPv2 authentication (such as the ntlm_auth tool).
 - "disabled" Do not accept NTLM (or LanMan) authentication of any level, nor permit NTLM password changes.
 - The default is "ntlmv2-only".
- Before Samba 4.7:

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- ▶ We just had "yes" and "no", just controlling NTLMv1 usage.
- The default was "no"
- In future:

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- We may implement more flexible schema similar to Windows
- This would allow us to keep NTLM alive for specific servers.

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New Kerberos Features (Part 1)



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Samba provided features

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- We try to emulate the features of the Windows 2008R2 DC functional level
- Everything else will need some development effort.
- ▶ Windows 2012 introduced KDC resource group compression:
 - This reduced the size of the PAC with a large number of resource group memberships.
 - Samba should implement this once we implement the SID expanding/filtering.
- ▶ Windows 2012 introduced support for Kerberos FAST (armoring):
 - Typically Kerberos authentication requests (AS-Req) use the password of the user to encrypt a timestamp.
 - This allows attackers to do offline dictionary against the users typically less random password.
 - Typically the passwords of trust accounts, e.g. computer accounts have trully random passwords.
 - The solution is to use a ticket created with the computer account to protect the users AS-REQ.

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New Kerberos Features (Part 2)



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- ▶ Windows 2012 introduced support for Branch Aware clients:
 - The client can tell on RODC not to forward a TGS-REQ
 - The client can force a forward to an RWDC
- Windows 2012 introduced support for Compound Identities:
 - If the client uses FAST, the KDC is able to know from which device (computer) the user is coming.
 - This KDC add a new PAC_DEVICE_INFO element to the Kerberos ticket.
 - As result the autorization token of the user will also have information of the device, which can be used to use more advanced access restrictions.
- ▶ Windows 2012 introduced support for CLAIMS:
 - An administrator can define and assign "claims".
 - It allows more flexible access control beside using groups.
 - The Kerberos ticket will contain PAC_CLIENT_CLAIMS_INFO and PAC_DEVICE_CLAIMS_INFO
 - More research is required to fully understand how CLAIMS work.

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New Kerberos Features (Part 3)



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- Windows 2012R2 introduced the Protected Users Security Group
 - SID: S-1-5-21-<domain>-525
 - Members can use Kerberos with AES keys
 - Members can not use Kerberos delegation
 - The TGT is only valid for 4 hours by default
 - Credentials are never cached
- Windows 2012R2 introduced Authentication Policies and Authentication Policy Silos:
 - Like "Selective Authentication" within a Forest.
 - More research is required to fully understand all details
- Windows 2016 introduced support for Privileged Identity Management (PIM):
 - This feature will add timed group memberships
 - E.g. an administrative user will only be a member of the domain admins group for an hour.
 - TGTs are only valid for a short time.
 - There's also a special forest trust mode for PIM.
 - More research is required to fully understand how PIM works.

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Goals for Samba



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► We need:

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- A scalable and robust authentication subsystem on domain members.
- Full support for trusted domains/forests as active directory domain controller.
- Most of the logic is handled by winbindd:
 - The requirements of DCs and domain members are similar
 - We just need to correct abstraction that can handle all possible trust flavours.
- Limit avoidable network communication:
 - Use idmap backends with IDMAP_TYPE_BOTH support => no LookupSid anymore
 - No domain controller communication when accepting Kerberos authentication
 - Reduce DNS and CLDAP requests, especially from the Kerberos libraries

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Using a strict trust routing table (Part1)



- Making efficient and robust usage of trust relationships:
 - It is required to construct a routing table that knows about routing via transitive trusts.
 - The table is constructed by the list of direct trusts and their (optionally) related forest information.
 - The goal is that communication only appears between direct trusts.
 - Only NETLOGON and LSA LookupSids/Names using Netlogon secure channel.
 - No SAMR and no LDAP anymore (at least by default)



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Using a strict trust routing table (Part2)



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- Using the routing table for Kerberos:
 - The routing table is mainly used in the KDC, which means the basics for two-way (INBOUND and OUTBOUD) trusts as an AD DC are already in place.
 - The client just talks to a KDC in the primary domain and follows referrals, it doesn't really need the routing table.
- Using the routing table for NTLMSSP:

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- It also needs to be used the NETLOGON and LSA servers in order to find out if a requests should be routed via winbindd to a trusted domain.
- The routing table needs to be used within winbindd.
- This will make the code much more robust as a domain member.
- And it will also provide the basics for two-way (INBOUND and OUTBOUD) trusts as an AD DC.

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Removing "map untrusted to domain" option



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- When a client authenticates as UNKNOWN\user it get silently mapped to LOCALSAMNAME\user
- ▶ Up to now we fetched a list of trusted domains from winbindd:
 - This list was used to evaluate if the domain is "untrusted"
 - "map untrusted to domain = yes/no" controls to what the "untrusted" domain name is mapped to.
 - But this is completely unreliable, e.g. with one-way trusts and other situations.
- It's the job of our DC to decide about trusts:
 - ▶ We need to pass non local authentication always (unchanged) to a DC.
 - NO_SUCH_USER together with authoritative=0 indicates a possible fallback.
 - ▶ We have this fixed by "map untrusted to domain = auto" in Samba 4.7
 - Samba 4.8 will remove that option completely while keeping the auto behavior.

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Full async authentication stack (Part1)



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old semi-async gensec_update api in Samba:

- Using gensec_update_ev() as a server:
 - Was possible for local non-blocking authentication on an AD DC
 - Is not usable with remote authentication at all

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Nested event loops are like threads without mutexes

Async gensec_update api attribute in Samba:

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Full async authentication stack (Part2)



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- Changing the callers to:
 - Use the sync wrapper gensec_update() if they only act as server only accepting Kerberos
 - Make use of the fully async gensec_update_send/recv() pair.
- The hardest part was rewriting of spnego.c
 - That module needed 82 patches in order to untangle the logic and make it completely async.
- auth_check_password_send/recv() was rewritten:
 - To allow backends to optionally provide check_password_send()/recv()
 - Only source4/auth/ntlm/auth_winbind.c (used as AD DC) makes use of it (yet).
- Auth methods in use:
 - NTLM auth: "anonymous sam winbind sam_ignoredomain"
 - NETLOGON: "sam winbind"
 - winbindd: "sam"

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Next Steps



- Disable SAMR and LDAP access as AD DC to trusted domains
- Make use of S4U2Self in winbindd
- Kerberos FAST in winbindd
- LSA LookupSids/LookupsNames
- Let winbindd use the trust routing table
- Automatic creation of foreignSecurityPrincipal objects
- Implement SID expanding/filtering
- Selective Authentication

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Further Authentication Topics



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- Let lower privileged services use kerberos authentication:
 - Needs explicit PAC verification with a domain controller
 - Needs a gss-proxy like gensec module
 - Let winbindd proxy an gss-proxy like interface
- Kerberos (constrained) delegation (S4U2Proxy)
- Further hardening

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- Extended Protection TLS Channel Binding Token CBT
- Server SPN target name validation level (SmbServerNameHardeningLevel, UnverifiedTargetName)
- Public Key Cryptography Based User-to-User Authentication
 - PKU2U (like Kerberos with PKINIT)
 - But the target server acts as a KDC over the gss_[init,accept]_sec_context() channel
 - Will replace NTLM in workgroup kind of setups
- [Group] Managed Service Accounts

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- Stefan Metzmacher, metze@samba.org
- https://www.sernet.com

Useful links follow on the next page ...



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Useful links (Part1)



SerNet

- [MS-APDS] Authentication Protocol Domain Support
- [MS-AUTHSOD] Authentication Services Protocols Overview
- [MS-DTYP] Windows Data Types
- [MS-LSAD] Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol
- ► [MS-LSAT] Local Security Authority (Translation Methods) Remote Protocol
- [MS-NLMP] NT LAN Manager (NTLM) Authentication Protocol
- [MS-PAC] Privilege Attribute Certificate Data Structure
- [MS-WMOD] Windows Management Protocols Overview
- draft-zhu-pku2u-09
- draft-zhu-negoex-04

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Useful links (Part2)

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- ► TECHNET: Authentication Policies and Authentication Policy Silos
- ► TECHNET: Changes in Kerberos Authentication (Windows 2008R2)
- ► TECHNET: Introducing Forest Search Order (Windows 2008R2)
- ► TECHNET: How Domain and Forest Trusts Work
- TECHNET: Kerberos Constrained Delegation Overview
- TECHNET: Extended Protection for Authentication
- TECHNET: Public Key Cryptography based User to User Authentication Overview (PKU2U)
- TECHNET: Protected Users Security Group
- ► TECHNET: Security Considerations for Trusts
- TECHNET: Server SPN target name validation level
- ► TECHNET: Windows Authentication Technical Overview
- ► TECHNET: What's New in Kerberos Authentication (Windows 2012)

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