

SDC STORAGE DEVELOPER CONFERENCE

Windows Authentication With Multiple Domains and Forests

Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Samba Team / SerNet

2017-09-13

Check for updates: https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2017/SDC/

Update from SambaXP 2017



- This is an update to my talk at SambaXP.
- "The Important Details Of Windows Authentication"
- Please have a look at the slides:
- https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2017/SambaXP/
- An audio recording is also available here:
- https://sambaxp.org/archive_data/SambaXP2017-AUDIO/Day3/Track2/
- Check for an updated version of this slides here:
- https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2017/SDC/

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Windows Trusts (2/35)

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- Windows Domains, Forests and Trusts
- Netlogon Secure Channel
- Authentication Protocols
- Authorization Token
- Trust Routing Table
- New Kerberos Features
- Thanks!
- Questions?

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
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Layout of a single Windows Domain






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Layout of an Active Directory Forest (with one Tree)



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Forest Information (with one Tree)



- TOP_LEVEL_NAME: example.com
- TOP_LEVEL_NAME: example.private
- DOMAIN_INFO: EXAMPLE; example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-11
- DOMAIN_INFO: ASIA; asia.example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-22
- DOMAIN_INFO: DEVEL; devel.asia.example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-33
- DOMAIN_INFO: PRODUCT; product.asia.example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-44
- DOMAIN_INFO: EUROPE; europe.example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-44




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Layout of an Active Directory Forest (with multiple Trees)



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Forest Information (with multiple Tree)



- TOP_LEVEL_NAME: corp1.private
- TOP_LEVEL_NAME: corp2.private
- DOMAIN_INFO: CORP1; corp1.private; S-1-5-21-77-88-11
- DOMAIN_INFO: DEVEL; devel.corp1.private; S-1-5-21-77-88-22
- DOMAIN_INFO: PRODUCT; product.corp1.private; S-1-5-21-99-88-33
- DOMAIN_INFO: CORP2; corp2.private; S-1-5-21-99-88-44
- DOMAIN_INFO: SUPPORT; support.corp2.private; S-1-5-21-99-88-55



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Windows Trusts (8/35)





LSA_TRUST_TYPE_DOWNLEVEL

- This is used for NT4 Domains.
- It can only handle NTLMSSP.

LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL

- This is used for AD Domains.
- It supports NTLMSSP by default
- ▶ It supports Kerberos, the Reality is the Dns-Domain-Name.

LSA_TRUST_TYPE_MIT

- This is used for tructs of BRC4120-compliant Kerberos.
- Unlikely to be implemented in Samba.

► LSA_TRUST_TYPE_DCE

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Not used in Windows.

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Windows Trusts (9/35)



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Trust Directions



Trusting vs. Trusted Domain

 Users of the "trusted" domain can access resources of the "trusting" domain.

LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND

- The local domain is the "trusted" domain
- ▶ The specified/remote domain () the "trusting" domain.
- Also known as INCOMING

LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION OUTBOUND

- The local domain is the "trusting" domain.
- The specified / remote domain is the "trusted" domain.
- Also known as OUTGOING.

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Transitive vs. Non-Transitive Trusts



Non-Transitive Trust

This is just a trust between two single domains.

Transitive Trust

- The trust between two single company is expanded to indirect trusts.
- DOM1 trusts DOM2, while DOM2 trusts DOM3, so DOM1 implicitly trusts DOM3.
- In some situations a transitive trust is some kind of default route.



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Trust Types (high level, Part 1)



- Workstation (Domain Member) Trust
 - ► LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND to the primary domain.
 - LSA_TRUST_TYPE_DOWNLEVEL (NT4) or LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (AD).
 - Transitive Trust as default route.
 - computer account can only reliable access its primary domain.

External Domain Trust

- LSA_TRUST_TYPE_DOWNLEVEL (NT4) or LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLE VEL (AD).
- Non-Transitive

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- LSA_TRUST_DYPE_UPLEVEL (AD) between two forest root domains.
- Transitive Trust (by default) between the two forests only.

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Trust Types (high level, Part 2 within Forests)

Parent Child Trusts

- LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND and LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
- LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (AD).
- LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST.
- The child is a DNS-subdomain of the parent
- Transitive Trust, on the parent with a route to the child and the related grandchildren.
- Transitive Trust, on the child as default route.
- Automatically created together with the child domain.

Tree Root Trusts

- Similar to Parent Child Trust.
- The new tree root is not DNS-domain below the forest root.
- Transitive Trust on the forest root with a route to the new tree root and the vehicle grandchildren.
- Transitive Fust, on the child as default route.
- Automatically created together with the new tree root domain

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Trust Types (high level, Part 2 within Forests)

Parent Child Trusts

- LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND and LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
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- Automatically created together with the new tree root domain.

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Trust Types (high level, Part 3 within Forests)



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Shortcut Trust

- LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND and/or LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
- LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL (AD).
- ► LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST.
- Non-Transitive, acts as direct route to the specified domain.
- Created by an administrator for performance reasons.



Trust Attributes (low level)



The content of the trustAttributes attribute in Samba:

typedef [public,bitmap32bit] bitmap {
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE = 0x00000001,
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_UPLEVEL_ONLY = 0x00000002,
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_QUARANTINED_DOMAIN = 0x00000004,
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE = 0x00000008,
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION = 0x00000010,
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST = 0x00000020,
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_TREAT_AS_EXTERNAL = 0x00000040,
LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_USES_RC4_ENCRYPTION = 0x00000080
// TODO LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION_NO_TGT_DELEGATION = 0x00000200
// TODO LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_PIM_TRUST = 0x00000400
<pre>} lsa_TrustAttributes;</pre>

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Forest (routing) Information



SerNet

- The information about a forest:
 - can be queried from the forest root of the "trusted" forest by netr_GetForestTrustInformation() constructed by the information under CN=Partitions, CN=Configuration,...
 - is stored in the "msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo" attribute in the root domain of the "trusting" forest.

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Forest (routing) Information



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- It is an array of records of the following types:
 - FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO includes Netbios-Name, DNS-Name and Domain-Sid.
 - FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME includes a top level DNS-Name that part of the forest (including all DNS-subdomains).
 - FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME_EX includes a top level DNS-Name that is explicitly excluded from the forest (including all DNS-subdomains).
 - Individual records will be disabled if conflicts with other trusts are detected.
 - ► Individual records can also be disabled by the admin.

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Netlogon Secure Schannel (Part1)



- ► Having an LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND Trust:
 - Means the "trusting" workstation/domain can establish a Netlogon Secure Channel to DCs of the "trusted" domain using the computer/trust account.
 - ► The NETLOGON protocol is bases on DCERPC, see [MS-NRPC].

Establishing a global session state with a "trusted" DC:

- netr_ServerReqChallenge()(a of the constraint of the constraint
- The global session state is indexed by the computer name of the "client".
- The global session state contains the initial session key, a sequence number
- Sambe uses 'struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState' for this state.
- This state is stored in netlogon_creds_cli.tdb (on the client) and schannel_store.tdb (on the server).

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Netlogon Secure Schannel (Part1)



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- Establishing a global session state with a "trusted" DC:
 - netr_ServerReqChallenge() and netr_ServerAuthenticate[2,3]() are used to do a challenge/response authentication
 - The global session state is indexed by the computer name of the "client".
 - The global session state contains the initial session key, a sequence number.
 - Samba uses 'struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState' for this state.
 - This state is stored in netlogon_creds_cli.tdb (on the client) and schannel_store.tdb (on the server).

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Netlogon Secure Schannel (Part2)



A lot of functions operate on the global session state:

- netr_LogonSamLogon[WithFlags](), netr_ServerPasswordSet[2](), netr_LogonGetDomainInfo(), netr_GetForestTrustInformation() and others.
- All functions using 'netr_Authenticator' arguments.
- These functions do some rolling crypto on the global session state.
- These functions need to be strictly ordered (globally!)
- Some of them also encrypt some application level fields with the current global session key.

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Netlogon Secure Schannel (Part3)



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The NETLOGON protocol implements a custom DCERPC authentication type (auth_type=68):

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- The DCERPC Bind/AlterContext just passes the domain and computer names to the server.
- The server takes a copy of the current global session based on the provided computer name.
- This copy will be the session key for the lifetime of the DCERPC auth context.
- Client and server provide DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY or DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY protection for the auth context.
- The connection doesn't support concurrent multiplexing and only one request at a time.

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Netlogon Secure Schannel (Part4)



Usage of DCERPC authentication type (auth_type=68)

- It is typically used for a protected NETLOGON connection.
- It is also used for LSA connections and the lsa_LookupNames4() and lsa_LookupSids3() calls.
- Typically the "trusting" side of the trust should only use these NETLOGON and LSA connections to communicate with the "trusted" domain.



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Netlogon Secure Schannel (Part5)



Authentication verification uses NETLOGON:

- netr_LogonSamLogon[WithFlags,Ex]() is typically used to verify NTLMSSP authentication.
- But it's not limited to NTLMSSP, e.g. Kerberos PAC-Validation.

Authentication should scale:

- netr_LogonSamLogonEx() is a optimization of netr_LogonSamLogon[WithFlugs]().
- It isn't bound to the net Authoriticator global ordering.
- It avoids application level encryption with the current global session key in most cases if DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY is in use.
- It can use multiple DCERPC connections to scale.

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Netlogon Secure Schannel (Part5)



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 - It can use multiple DCERPC connections to scale.

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SPNEGO Authentication example



 All application protocols used in active directory domains use SPNEGO (RFC 4178, [MS-SPNG]) in order to negotiate between NTLMSSP ([MS-NLMP]) or Kerberos (RFC 4120, [MS-KILE])

```
▼ SMB2 (Server Message Block Protocol version 2)
▶ SMB2 Header
▼ Session Setup Request (0x01)
  ▶ StructureSize: 0x0019
  ▶ Flags: 0
  ▶ Security mode: 0x02, Signing required
  ▶ Capabilities: 0x00000001, DFS
    Channel: None (0x00000000)
    Previous Session Id: 0x000000000000000
  ▼ Security Blob: 60820c9306062b0601050502a0820c8730820c83a0243022...
       Offset: 0x00000058
       Length: 3223
     ▼ GSS-API Generic Security Service Application Program Interface
         OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.2 (SPNEGO - Simple Protected Negotiation)
       ▼ Simple Protected Negotiation
          ▼ negTokenInit
             ▼mechTypes: 3 items
                 MechType: 1.2.840.48018.1.2.2 (MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5)
                 MechType: 1.2.840.113554.1.2.2 (KRB5 - Kerberos 5)
                 MechType: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.2.10 (NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider)
               mechToken: 60820c5106092a864886f71201020201006e820c4030820c...
             krb5 blob: 60820c5106092a864886f71201020201006e820c4030820c...
```

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Kerberos Network Traffic With Trusts



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- Client (administrator@W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:00:00:01)
- DC in Client-Domain (W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:83)
- Forest-Trust between W2012R2-L4.BASE and W4EDOM-L4.BASE
- DC in Server-Domain (W4EDOM-L4.BASE) (нw 00:00:00:09:01:33)
- Server (w2008r8-132) in W4EDOM-L4.BASE (нw 00:00:00:09:01:32)
- Access to \\w2008r2-132.w4edom-l4.base using Kerberos

AS-REQ	administrator@W2012R2-L4.BASE	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:83
AS-REP	krbtgt/W2012R2-L4.BASE@W2012R2-L4.BASE	00:00:00:09:01:83	00:00:00:09:00:01
TGS-REQ	cifs/w2008r2-133.w4edom-l4.base@W2012R2-L4.BASE	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:83
TGS-REP	krbtgt/W4EDOM-L4.BASE@W2012R2-L4.BASE	00:00:00:09:01:83	00:00:00:09:00:01
TGS-REQ	cifs/w2008r2-133.w4edom-l4.base@W4EDOM-L4.BASE	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:33
TGS-REP	cifs/w2008r2-133.w4edom-l4.base@W4EDOM-L4.BASE	00:00:00:09:01:33	00:00:00:09:00:01
Session	Setup Request	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:32
Session	Setup Response	00:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:00:01

The client talks to DCs directly.

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The server gets the authorization data from the kerberos ticket

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NTLMSSP Network Traffic With Trusts



SerNet

- Client (administrator@W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:00:00:01)
- DC in Client-Domain (W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:83)
- Forest-Trust between W2012R2-L4.BASE and W4EDOM-L4.BASE
- DC in Server-Domain (W4EDOM-L4.BASE) (нw 00:00:00:09:01:33)
- Server (w2008r8-132) in W4EDOM-L4.BASE (нw 00:00:00:09:01:32)
- Access to \\w2008r2-132.w4edom-I4.base using NTLMSSP

Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:32
Session Setup Response, Error: STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED, NTLMSSP	00:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:00:01
Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: W2012R2-L4.BASE\administrator	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:32
NetrLogonSamLogonEx request	00:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:01:33
NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags request	00:00:00:09:01:33	00:00:00:09:01:83
NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags response	00:00:00:09:01:83	00:00:00:09:01:33
NetrLogonSamLogonEx response	00:00:00:09:01:33	00:00:00:09:01:32
Session Setup Response	00:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:00:01

The server talks to the DC in its own domain only.

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The DC may forward the request to trusted domains.

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The result of a successful authentication



- Inputs to authentication:
 - The client typically provides a full qualified username together with a password.
 - Smartcards can also be used to do Kerberos (PKINIT) authentication.
- Output from authentication:
 - ▶ The target server needs to make sure the client is authenticated.
 - Typically client and server negotiate a session key.
 - The target server gets an authorization token for the authenticated user.
 - ► The authorization token is contained in the Kerberos service ticket.
 - netr_LegonSamLogon[WithFlags,Ex]() provides the authorization token for NTLMSSF

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- The target server gets an authorization token for the authenticated user.
- ► The authorization token is contained in the Kerberos service ticket.
- netr_LogonSamLogon[WithFlags,Ex]() provides the authorization token for NTLMSSP.

Windows Trusts (25/35)

The authorization token



- Elements in the token:
 - It contains things like username, fullname, logon_domain, various timestamps.
 - The most important information is the list of group memberships.
- The token provided by the "trusted" domain
 - ► Needs to be expanded with local groups on the "Vusting" side.
 - Needs to be do SID-Filtering on "trusting" side to avoid faked group memberships.
 - The exact SID-Filtering rules depend on the trustAttribute values.
 - It is important to do the expanding and filtering on all trust boundaries of a transitive chain.
 - Currently Samba does not do any SID-Filtering at all!
- ► In Samba we use struct auth_session_info' for the expanded token:
 - It contains a list of SIDS.
 - The details of the Windows user.
 - It contains a uid and a list of gid's.
 - The unix username.

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Authorization Token without Authentication (Part1)

- There're some situations when a service needs to impersonate a user locally:
 - This can happen without getting an authentication for that user.
 - SSH public-key authentication, sudo or nfs3 access are tyipical usecases.
- Getting an authorization token without authentication is tricky:
 - Currently winbindd tries to get the 'tokenGroups' of the user object via LDAP
 - In situations with trusted domains it means that winbindd will try to connect a DC of the users primary domain without having a direct trust to it.
 - There're a lot of situations where this doesn't work, e.g. with OUTPOUND only pusts.
 - It is a very hard task because the expanding and filtering at the trust boundaries of the transitive chain can't be simulated.
 - So the result is often wrong!

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Authorization Token without Authentication (Part2)

- The only reliable solution is S4U2Self:
 - S4U2Self ([MS-SFU]), a Kerberos extension, allows a service to ask a KDC for an service ticket for a given user.
 - Sadly there're quite some bugs in current versions of MIT Kerberos and Heimdal.

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But the bugs can be fixed.

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Using a strict trust routing table (Part1)



- Making efficient and robust usage of trust relationships:
 - It is required to construct a routing table that knows about routing via transitive trusts.
 - The table is constructed by the list of direct trusts and their (optionally) related forest information.
 - The goal is that communication only appears between direct trusts.



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Using a strict trust routing table (Part2)



- Using the routing table for Kerberos:
 - The routing table is mainly used in the KDC, which means the basics for two-way (INBOUND and OUTBOUD) trusts as an AD DC are already in place.
 - The client just talk to a KDC in the primary domain and follow referrals, it doesn't really need the routing table.
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 - It also needs to be used the NATLOGON and LSA servers in order to find out if a requests should be build be winbindd to a trusted domain.
 - The routing table needs to be used within winbindd.
 - This will make the code much more robust as a domain member.
 - And it will also provide the basics for two-way (INBOUND and OUTBOUD) trusts as an AD DC.

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New Kerberos Features (Part 1)



Samba provided features

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- We try to emulate the features of the Windows 2008R2 DC functional level
- Everything else will need some development effort.
- Windows 2012 introduced support for Kerbero FAST:
 - Typically Kerberos authentication requests (AS-Req) use the password of the user to encrypt a timestamp.
 - This allows attackers to do office dictionary against the users typically less random password
 - Typically the passwords of trust accounts, e.g. computer accounts have trully random passwords.
 - The solution is to use a ticket created with the computer account to protect the users AS-REQ.

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New Kerberos Features (Part 2)



- Windows 2012 introduced support for Compound Identities:
 - If the client uses FAST, the KDC is able to know from which device (computer) the user is coming.
 - This KDC add a new PAC_DEVICE_INFO element to the Kerberos ticket.
 - As result the autorization token of the user will also have information of the device, which can be used to use more advanced access restrictions.
- Windows 2012 introduced support for CLAIMS:
 - ► An administrator can define and assign "claims".
 - It allows more flexible access control beside using groups.
 - The Kerbergs ticket will contain PAC_CLIENT_CLAIMS_INFO and PAC_DEVICE_CLAUS_INFO
 - More received is required to fully understand how CLAIMS work.

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New Kerberos Features (Part 3)

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- Windows 2016 introduced support for Privileged Identity Management (PIM):
 - This feature will add timed group memberships
 - E.g. an administrative user will only be a member of the domain admins group for an hour.
 - ► The lifetime for Kerberos tickets is very limited compared to the default of 10 hours, with a renew up to a week.
 - There's also a special forest trust mode for PIM.

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• More research is required to fully understand how PIM work.

Useful links



- TECHNET: "How Domain and Forest Trusts Work"
- ▶ [MS-AUTHSOD]
- [MS-PAC]
- ▶ [MS-LSAD]
- [MS-LSAT]
- ► [MS-DTYP]



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Questions?



- Stefan Metzmacher, metze@samba.org
- https://www.sernet.com



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