



# Windows Authentication With Multiple Domains and Forests

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https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2017/SDC/ TODO: Claims, Compound, FAST, PIM, URLs! (draft)

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#### Topics



- Windows Domains, Forests and Trusts
- Netlogon Secure Channel
- Authentication Protocols
- Authorization Token
- Trust Routing Table
- New Kerberos Features
- Thanks!
- Questions?



### Layout of a single Windows Domain

Netbios-Name: EXAMPLE Dns-Name: example.com SID: S-1-5-21-987-654-321 DN: DC=example.DC=com	Domain
Domain database: EXAMPLE, example.com, 5-1-5-21-987-654-321 *Administrator user, S-1-5-21-987-654-321-500 *Domain Admins group, S-1-5-21-987-654-321-512	
POC1\$ computer, S-1-5-21-987-654-321-1001   PDC3\$ computer, S-1-5-21-987-654-321-1002   PDC3\$ computer, S-1-5-21-987-654-321-1003   PDC4\$ computer, S-1-5-21-987-654-321-103   PDC4\$ computer, S-1-5-21-987-654-321-1501   *SERVER1\$ computer, S-1-5-21-987-654-321-1502   *CLIENT1\$ computer, S-1-5-21-987-654-321-1503	
DC1 (RWDC) DC2 (RWDC) DC3 (RWDC) CC4 (RWDC) CC4 (RWDC)	workstation_trust


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Layout of an Active Directory Forest (with one Tree)



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Forest Information (with one Tree)


- TOP\_LEVEL\_NAME: example.com
- TOP\_LEVEL\_NAME: example.private
- DOMAIN\_INFO: EXAMPLE; example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-11
- DOMAIN\_INFO: ASIA; asia.example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-22
- DOMAIN\_INFO: DEVEL; devel.asia.example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-33
- DOMAIN\_INFO: PRODUCT; product.asia.example.com; S-1-5-21-99-88-44
- DOMAIN\_INFO: EUROPE: europe.example.com: S-1-5-21-99-88-44

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Layout of an Active Directory Forest (with multiple Trees)



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#### Forest Information (with multiple Tree)

#### TOP\_LEVEL\_NAME: corp1.private

- TOP\_LEVEL\_NAME: corp2.private
- DOMAIN\_INFO: CORP1; corp1.private; S-1-5-21-77-88-11
- DOMAIN\_INFO: DEVEL; devel.corp1.private; S-1-5-21-77-88-22
- DOMAIN\_INFO: PRODUCT; product.corp1.private; S-1-5-21-99-88-33
- DOMAIN\_INFO: CORP2; corp2.private; S-1-5-21-99-88-44
- DOMAIN\_INFO: SUPPORT: support.corp2.private: S-1-5-21-99-88-55

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#### Trust Types (low level)



- I SA TRUST TYPE DOWNLEVEL
  - This is used for NT4 Domains.
  - It can only handle NTLMSSP.
- LSA\_TRUST\_TYPE\_UPLEVEL
  - This is used for AD Domains.
  - It supports NTLMSSP by default.
  - It supports Kerberos, the Realm is the Dns-Domain-Name.
- LSA\_TRUST\_TYPE\_MIT
  - This is used for trusts to RFC4120-compliant Kerberos.
  - Unlikely to be implemented in Samba.
- LSA TRUST TYPE DCE
  - Not used in Windows.

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### Trust Directions

- Trusting vs. Trusted Domain
  - Users of the "trusted" domain can access resources of the "trusting" domain

#### LSA TRUST DIRECTION INBOUND

- The local domain is the "trusted" domain.
- The specified/remote domain is the "trusting" domain.
- Also known as INCOMING
- LSA TRUST DIRECTION OUTBOUND
  - The local domain is the "trusting" domain.
  - The specified/remote domain is the "trusted" domain.
  - Also known as OUTGOING

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#### Transitive vs. Non-Transitive Trusts



- Non-Transitive Trust
  - This is just a trust between two single domains.

#### Transitive Trust

- The trust between two single domains is expanded to indirect trusts.
- DOM1 trusts DOM2, while DOM2 trusts DOM3, so DOM1 implicitly trusts DOM3.
- In some situations a transitive trust is some kind of default route.

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### Trust Types (high level, Part 1)

- Workstation (Domain Member) Trust
  - ► LSA\_TRUST\_DIRECTION\_OUTBOUND to the primary domain.
  - LSA\_TRUST\_TYPE\_DOWNLEVEL (NT4) or LSA\_TRUST\_TYPE\_UPLEVEL (AD).
  - Transitive Trust as default route.
  - computer account can only reliable access its primary domain.
- External Domain Trust
  - LSA\_TRUST\_TYPE\_DOWNLEVEL (NT4) or LSA\_TRUST\_TYPE\_UPLEVEL (AD).
  - Non-Transitive
- Forest Trust
  - LSA\_TRUST\_TYPE\_UPLEVEL (AD) between two forest root domains.
  - Transitive Trust (by default) between the two forests only.

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#### Trust Types (high level, Part 2 within Forests)



- Parent Child Trusts
  - LSA TRUST DIRECTION INBOUND and LSA\_TRUST\_DIRECTION\_OUTBOUND
  - LSA\_TRUST\_TYPE\_UPLEVEL (AD).
  - LSA\_TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_WITHIN\_FOREST.
  - The child is a DNS-subdomain of the parent
  - Transitive Trust, on the parent with a route to the child and the related grandchildren.
  - Transitive Trust, on the child as default route.
  - Automatically created together with the child domain.
- Tree Root Trusts
  - Similar to Parent Child Trust.
  - The new tree root is not DNS-domain below the forest root.
  - Transitive Trust, on the forest root with a route to the new tree root and the related grandchildren.
  - Transitive Trust, on the child as default route.
  - Automatically created together with the new tree root domain.

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### Trust Types (high level, Part 3 within Forests)

#### Shortcut Trust

- LSA\_TRUST\_DIRECTION\_INBOUND and/or LSA\_TRUST\_DIRECTION\_OUTBOUND
- LSA\_TRUST\_TYPE\_UPLEVEL (AD).
- LSA\_TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_WITHIN\_FOREST.
- Non-Transitive, acts as direct route to the specified domain.
- Created by an administrator for performance reasons.

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Trust Attributes (low level)



The content of the trustAttributes attribute in Samba:

typedef [public.bitmap32bit] bitmap { LSA\_TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_NON\_TRANSITIVE = 0x00000001 LSA\_TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_UPLEVEL\_ONLY  $= 0 \times 00000002$ . LSA\_TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_QUARANTINED\_DOMAIN = 0x00000004, LSA\_TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_FOREST\_TRANSITIVE = 0x00000008 LSA\_TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_CROSS\_ORGANIZATION = 0x00000010. LSA\_TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_WITHIN\_FOREST  $= 0 \times 00000020$ LSA\_TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_TREAT\_AS\_EXTERNAL = 0x00000040. LSA\_TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_USES\_RC4\_ENCRYPTION = 0x00000080 // TODO LSA\_TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_CROSS\_ORGANIZATION\_NO\_TGT\_DELEGATION = 0x00000200 // TODO LSA\_TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_PIM\_TRUST  $= 0 \times 00000400$ } lsa\_TrustAttributes;

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#### Forest (routing) Information

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- The information about a forest:
  - can be queried from the forest root of the "trusted" forest by netr\_GetForestTrustInformation() constructed by the information under CN=Partitions,CN=Configuration,...
  - is stored in the "msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo" attribute in the root domain of the "trusting" forest.
- It is an array of records of the following types:
  - FOREST\_TRUST\_DOMAIN\_INFO includes Netbios-Name, DNS-Name and Domain-Sid.
  - FOREST\_TRUST\_TOP\_LEVEL\_NAME includes a top level DNS-Name that part of the forest (including all DNS-subdomains).
  - FOREST\_TRUST\_TOP\_LEVEL\_NAME\_EX includes a top level DNS-Name that is explicitly excluded from the forest (including all DNS-subdomains).
  - Individual records will be disabled if conflicts with other trusts are detected.
  - Individual records can also be disabled by the admin.



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#### Netlogon Secure Schannel (Part1)



- Having an LSA\_TRUST\_DIRECTION\_OUTBOUND Trust:
  - Means the "trusting" workstation/domain can establish a Netlogon Secure Channel to DCs of the "trusted" domain using the computer/trust account.
  - The NETLOGON protocol is bases on DCERPC, see [MS-NRPC].
- Establishing a global session state with a "trusted" DC:
  - netr\_ServerReqChallenge() and netr\_ServerAuthenticate[2,3]() are used to do a challenge/response authentication
  - The global session state is indexed by the computer name of the " client"
  - The global session state contains the initial session key, a sequence number.
  - Samba uses 'struct netlogon\_creds\_CredentialState' for this state.
  - This state is stored in netlogon\_creds\_cli.tdb (on the client) and schannel\_store.tdb (on the server).

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# Netlogon Secure Schannel (Part2)

- A lot of functions operate on the global session state:
  - netr\_LogonSamLogon[WithFlags](), netr\_ServerPasswordSet[2](), netr\_LogonGetDomainInfo(), netr\_GetForestTrustInformation() and others.
  - All functions using 'netr\_Authenticator' arguments.
  - These functions do some rolling crypto on the global session state.
  - These functions need to be strictly ordered (globally!)
  - Some of them also encrypt some application level fields with the current global session key.

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#### Netlogon Secure Schannel (Part3)



- The NETLOGON protocol implements a custom DCERPC authentication type (auth\_type=68):
  - The DCERPC Bind/AlterContext just passes the domain and computer names to the server.
  - The server takes a copy of the current global session based on the provided computer name.
  - This copy will be the session key for the lifetime of the DCERPC auth context.
  - Client and server provide DCERPC\_AUTH\_LEVEL\_INTEGRITY or DCERPC\_AUTH\_LEVEL\_PRIVACY protection for the auth context.
  - The connection doesn't support concurrent multiplexing and only one request at a time.

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Netlogon Secure Schannel (Part4)

#### Usage of DCERPC authentication type (auth\_type=68)

- It is typically used for a protected NETLOGON connection.
- It is also used for LSA connections and the lsa\_LookupNames4() and lsa\_LookupSids3() calls.
- Typically the "trusting" side of the trust should only use these NETLOGON and LSA connections to communicate with the "trusted" domain.

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#### Netlogon Secure Schannel (Part5)



- Authentication verification uses NETLOGON:
  - netr\_LogonSamLogon[WithFlags,Ex]() is typically used to verify NTLMSSP authentication.
  - But it's not limited to NTLMSSP, e.g. Kerberos PAC-Validation.
- Authentication should scale:
  - netr\_LogonSamLogonEx() is an optimization of netr\_LogonSamLogon[WithFlags]().
  - It isn't bound to the netr\_Authenticator global ordering.
  - It avoids application level encryption with the current global session key in most cases if DCERPC\_AUTH\_LEVEL\_PRIVACY is in use.
  - It can use multiple DCERPC connections to scale.

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#### SPNEGO Authentication example

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 All application protocols used in active directory domains use SPNEGO (RFC 4178, [MS-SPNG]) in order to negotiate between NTLMSSP ([MS-NLMP]) or Kerberos (RFC 4120, [MS-KILE])

▼ SMB2 (Server Message E	lock Protocol version 2)			
▶ SMB2 Header				
▼ Session Setup Reque	st (0x01)			
StructureSize: 0)	.0019			
▶ Flags: 0				
	02, Signing required			
Capabilities: 0x0	0000001, DFS			
Channel: None (0)				
	Id: 0x000000000000000			
▼ Security Blob: 60	820c9306062b0601050502a08	20c8730820c83a0243022.		
Offset: 0x0000	2058			
Length: 3223				
	c Security Service Applic			
	5.5.2 (SPNEGO - Simple F	rotected Negotiation)		
	cted Negotiation			
▼ negTokenI				
	es: 3 items			
	Type: 1.2.840.48018.1.2.2		erberos 5)	
	Type: 1.2.840.113554.1.2.			
	Type: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.2			rity Support Provider)
	en: 60820c5106092a8648861			
▶ krb5_b]	ob: 60820c5106092a8648861	71201020201006e820c403	9820c	

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#### Kerberos Network Traffic With Trusts

- Client (administrator@W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:00:01)
- DC in Client-Domain (W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:83)
- Forest-Trust between W2012R2-L4.BASE and W4EDOM-L4.BASE
- DC in Server-Domain (W4EDOM-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:33)
- Server (w2008r8-132) in W4EDOM-L4.BASE (HW 00:00:00:09:01:32)
- Access to \\w2008r2-132.w4edom-I4.base using Kerberos

AS-REQ	administrator@W2012R2-L4.BASE	60:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:83
AS-REP	krbtgt/W2012R2-L4.BASE@W2012R2-L4.BASE	60:00:00:09:01:83	00:00:00:09:00:01
TGS-REQ	cifs/w2008r2-133.w4edom-l4.base@W2012R2-L4.BASE	60:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:83
TGS-REP	krbtgt/W4EDOM-L4.BASE@W2012R2-L4.BASE	60:00:00:09:01:83	00:00:00:09:00:01
TGS-REQ		60:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:33
TGS-REP	cifs/w2008r2-133.w4edom-l4.base@W4EDOM-L4.BASE	60:00:00:09:01:33	00:00:00:09:00:01
Session	Setup Request	60:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:32
Session	Setup Response	60:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:00:01

- The client talks to DCs directly.
- The server gets the authorization data from the kerberos ticket

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#### NTLMSSP Network Traffic With Trusts

- Client (administrator@W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:00:01)
- DC in Client-Domain (W2012R2-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:83)
- Forest-Trust between W2012R2-L4.BASE and W4EDOM-L4.BASE
- DC in Server-Domain (W4EDOM-L4.BASE) (HW 00:00:00:09:01:33)
- Server (w2008r8-132) in W4EDOM-L4.BASE (HW 00:00:00:09:01:32)
- Access to \\w2008r2-132.w4edom-I4.base using NTLMSSP

Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE	00:00:00:09:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:32
Session Setup Response, Error: STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED, NTLMSSP.	. 00:00:00:09:01:32	00:00:00:09:00:01
Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: W2012R2-L4.BASE\administrator	00:00:00:00:00:01	00:00:00:09:01:32
NetrLogonSamLogonEx request	00:00:00:00:01:32	00:00:00:09:01:33
NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags request	00:00:00:09:01:33	00:00:00:09:01:83
NetrLogonSamLogonWithFlags response	00:00:00:09:01:83	00:00:00:09:01:33
NetrLogonSamLogonEx response	00:00:00:09:01:33	00:00:00:09:01:32
Session Setup Response	00:00:00:00:01:32	00:00:00:09:00:01

The server talks to the DC in its own domain only.

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The DC may forward the request to trusted domains.



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#### The result of a successful authentication



- Inputs to authentication:
  - The client typically provides a full qualified username together with a password.
  - Smartcards can also be used to do Kerberos (PKINIT) authentication.
- Output from authentication:
  - The target server needs to make sure the client is authenticated.
  - Typically client and server negotiate a session key.
  - The target server gets an authorization token for the authenticated user
  - The authorization token is contained in the Kerberos service ticket.
  - netr\_LogonSamLogon[WithFlags,Ex]() provides the authorization token for NTLMSSP.

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#### The authorization token

- Elements in the token:
  - It contains things like username, fullname, logon\_domain, various timestamps.
  - The most important information is the list of group memberships.
- The token provided by the "trusted" domain:
  - Needs to be expanded with local groups on the "trusting" side.
  - Needs to be do SID-Filtering on "trusting" side to avoid faked group memberships.
  - The exact SID-Filtering rules depend on the trustAttribute values.
  - It is important to do the expanding and filtering on all trust boundaries of a transitive chain
  - Currently Samba does not do any SID-Filtering at all!
- In Samba we use 'struct auth\_session\_info' for the expanded token:
  - It contains a list of SIDS.
  - The details of the Windows user.
  - It contains a uid and a list of gid's.
  - The unix username



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#### Authorization Token without Authentication (Part1)

- There're some situations when a service needs to impersonate a user locally:
  - This can happen without getting an authentication for that user.
  - SSH public-key authentication, sudo or nfs3 access are tyipical usecases.
- Getting an authorization token without authentication is tricky:
  - Currently winbindd tries to get the 'tokenGroups' of the user object via LDAP
  - In situations with trusted domains it means that winbindd will try to connect a DC of the users primary domain without having a direct trust to it.
  - There're a lot of situations where this doesn't work, e.g. with OUTBOUND only trusts.
  - It is a very hard task because the expanding and filtering at the trust boundaries of the transitive chain can't be simulated.
  - So the result is often wrong!

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Authorization Token without Authentication (Part2)

- ▶ The only reliable solution is S4U2Self:
  - S4U2Self ([MS-SFU]), a Kerberos extension, allows a service to ask a KDC for an service ticket for a given user.
  - Sadly there're quite some bugs in current versions of MIT Kerberos and Heimdal.
  - But the bugs can be fixed.

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#### Using a strict trust routing table (Part1)



- Making efficient and robust usage of trust relationships:
  - It is required to construct a routing table that knows about routing via transitive trusts.
  - The table is constructed by the list of direct trusts and their (optionally) related forest information.
  - > The goal is that communication only appears between direct trusts.

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#### Using a strict trust routing table (Part2)

- Using the routing table for Kerberos:
  - The routing table is mainly used in the KDC, which means the basics for two-way (INBOUND and OUTBOUD) trusts as an AD DC are already in place.
  - The client just talk to a KDC in the primary domain and follow referrals, it doesn't really need the routing table.
- Using the routing table for NTLMSSP:
  - It also needs to be used the NETLOGON and LSA servers in order to find out if a requests should be routed via winbindd to a trusted domain.
  - The routing table needs to be used within winbindd.
  - > This will make the code much more robust as a domain member.
  - And it will also provide the basics for two-way (INBOUND and OUTBOUD) trusts as an AD DC.



#### New Kerberos Features (Part 1)



- Samba provided features
  - We try to emulate the features of the Windows 2008R2 DC functional level
  - Everything else will need some development effort.
- Windows 2012 introduced support for Kerberos FAST:
  - Typically Kerberos authentication requests (AS-Req) use the password of the user to encrypt a timestamp.
  - This allows attackers to do offline dictionary against the users typically less random password.
  - Typically the passwords of trust accounts, e.g. computer accounts have trully random passwords.
  - The solution is to use a ticket created with the computer account to protect the users AS-REQ.

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### New Kerberos Features (Part 2)

- Windows 2012 introduced support for Compound Identities:
  - If the client uses FAST, the KDC is able to know from which device (computer) the user is coming.
  - This KDC add a new PAC\_DEVICE\_INFO element to the Kerberos ticket.
  - As result the autorization token of the user will also have information of the device, which can be used to use more advanced access restrictions.
- Windows 2012 introduced support for CLAIMS:
  - An administrator can define and assign "claims".
  - It allows more flexible access control beside using groups.
  - The Kerberos ticket will contain PAC\_CLIENT\_CLAIMS\_INFO and PAC\_DEVICE\_CLAIMS\_INFO
  - More research is required to fully understand how CLAIMS work.

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#### New Kerberos Features (Part 3)



- Windows 2016 introduced support for Privileged Identity Management (PIM):
  - This feature will add timed group memberships
  - E.g. an administrative user will only be a member of the domain admins group for an hour.
  - The lifetime for Kerberos tickets is very limited compared to the default of 10 hours, with a renew up to a week.
  - There's also a special forest trust mode for PIM.
  - More research is required to fully understand how PIM work.

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#### Useful links

- TECHNET: "How Domain and Forest Trusts Work
- [MS-AUTHSOD]
- [MS-PAC]
- [MS-LSAD]
- [MS-LSAT]
- [MS-DTYP]

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#### Questions?



- Stefan Metzmacher, metze@samba.org
- https://www.sernet.com



